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Equal surplus division value
Axiomatization
a b s t r a c t
We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine
combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a
player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, 2014), then any two other players are
equally affected.
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Cooperative game theory provides a mathematical framework
or allocating the worth generated by a group of cooperating
layers. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game
henceforth) consists of a set of players and a characteristic func-
tion that specifies a worth for each coalition of players. The equal
division (ED) value and the equal surplus division (ESD) value are
two well-known egalitarian values for TU-games. In particular,
the ED value, the ESD value, and the class of their affine combi-
nations have been given a number of axiomatic characterizations.
This paper develops new characterizations.
Our characterizations involve a new axiom relying on the
separatorization due to Zou et al. (2020). Separatorization of
a player refers to the complete loss of productive potential of
cooperation, in the sense that the worth of any coalition con-
taining this player equals the sum of the stand-alone worths of
the players in this coalition, while the worth of any coalition
without her remains unchanged. This operation is in line with
‘veto-ification’ introduced in van den Brink and Funaki (2009),
dummification introduced in Béal et al. (2018), and nullification
studied in Béal et al. (2016), Ferrières (2017), Kongo (2018, 2019,
2020). The difference among them lies in which role that a player
acts as. Specifically, veto-ification, dummification, nullification,
and separatorization, respectively, suppose a player becoming
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165-1765/© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.a veto player, a dummy player, a null player, and a separator
(also known as a dummifying player in Casajus and Huettner,
2014a) in a TU-game. There exist several axioms which evaluate
the consequences of the aforementioned operations in TU-games.
Assuming the same change in payoff for all other players under
such operation, van den Brink and Funaki (2009) suggest the
veto equal loss property for the ED value, and Ferrières (2017)
and Kongo (2018) independently suggest the nullified equal loss
property for the ED value, the ESD value and the class of their
convex combinations. Similarly, we define the axiom of equal loss
under separatorization imposing the same requirement, except
that a player becomes a separator.
In this paper, we show that equal loss under separatorization
and efficiency yield a family of values that all have in common
that they equally split the worth of the grand coalition. This
family is not identical to the family implied by the axioms of
the nullified equal loss property and efficiency as given by Fer-
rières (2017). We characterize the class of affine combinations of
the ED and ESD values by using the two axioms in addition to
fairness (van den Brink, 2002) and homogeneity. While Ferrières
(2017) characterizes the classes of affine and convex combina-
tions of the ED and ESD values involving the nullified equal
loss property, we highlight that replacing the nullified equal loss
property by equal loss under separatorization yields a new char-
acterization. Moreover, parallel to the axiomatic results in Kongo
(2018), we provide characterizations of both the ED value and the
ESD value.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides ba-
sic definitions and notation. Section 3 introduces the notion of
equal loss under separatorization. Section 4 presents main results.
Section 5 concludes.








2. Basic definitions and notation
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite and fixed set of players such
that n ≥ 3. The cardinality of any set S is denoted by |S| or s. A TU-
game is a pair (N, v) where N is a set of players and v : 2N → R
is a characteristic function with v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N is a
coalition, and v(S) is the worth of this coalition. The class of all
TU-games with player set N is denoted by GN .
A TU-game (N, v) is additive if v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}) for all S ⊆ N .
A TU-game (N, v) is superadditive if v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for
all S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅. A TU-game (N, v) is monotone
if v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N with S ⊆ T . The null game is
the game (N, v0) given by v0(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N . For S ⊆ N ,
S ̸= ∅, the unanimity TU-game (N, uS) is given by uS(T ) = 1
if T ⊇ S, and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise. Given (N, v), (N, w) ∈ GN
and a, b ∈ R, the TU-game (N, av + bw) ∈ GN is given by
(av + bw)(S) = av(S) + bw(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Player i ∈ N is a null player in (N, v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for
all S ⊆ N\{i}; player i ∈ N is a separator or dummifying player in
(N, v) if v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}) for all S ⊆ N with i ∈ S; player i ∈ N
is a nullifying player in (N, v) if v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N with i ∈ S.
Players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in (N, v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j})
for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
A value on GN is a function ψ that assigns a payoff vector
ψ(N, v) ∈ RN to every TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN . The equal division




v(N), for all (N, v) ∈ GN , i ∈ N.
The equal surplus division value (ESD value) (Driessen and
Funaki, 1991) is given by






v({j})], for all (N, v) ∈ GN , i ∈ N.
We recall the following axioms and results.
• Efficiency, E. For all (N, v) ∈ GN ,
∑
i∈N ψi(N, v) = v(N).
• Linearity, L. For all (N, v), (N, w) ∈ GN and a, b ∈ R,
ψ(N, av + bw) = aψ(N, v) + bψ(N, w).
• Additivity, A. For all (N, v), (N, w) ∈ GN , ψ(N, v + w) =
ψ(N, v) + ψ(N, w).
• Symmetry, S. For all (N, v) ∈ GN and all i, j ∈ N being
symmetric in (N, v), ψi(N, v) = ψj(N, v).
• Desirability, D. For all (N, v) ∈ GN and all i, j ∈ N such that
v(S∪{i}) ≥ v(S∪{j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}, ψi(N, v) ≥ ψj(N, v).
• Superadditive monotonicity, SM. For every superadditive
and monotone TU-game (N, v) ∈ GN and all i ∈ N ,
ψi(N, v) ≥ 0.
• Nullified equal loss property, NEL. For all (N, v) ∈ GN , all
h ∈ N and all i, j ∈ N\{h}, ψi(N, v)−ψi(N, vh0) = ψj(N, v)−
ψj(N, vh0), where (N, v
h
0) is given by v
h
0(S) = v(S\{h}) for all
S ⊆ N .
Theorem 1 (see Ferrières, 2017). A value ψ on GN satisfies E, NEL,
L, and S if and only if there is β ∈ R such thatψ = βESD+(1−β)ED.
Theorem 2 (see Ferrières, 2017). A value ψ on GN satisfies E,
NEL, A, D, and SM if and only if there is β ∈ [0, 1] such that
ψ = βESD + (1 − β)ED.
• Null game property, NG. For the null game (N, v0) ∈ GN and
all i ∈ N , ψi(N, v0) = 0.
• Grand coalition monotonicity, GM (Casajus and Huettner,
2014b). For all (N, v), (N, w) ∈ GN with v(N) ≥ w(N) and
all i ∈ N , ψ (N, v) ≥ ψ (N, w).i i• Id+sur monotonicity, ISM (Yokote and Funaki, 2017). For all





j∈N w({j}) and v({i}) ≥ w({i}), ψi(N, v) ≥ ψi(N, w).
Theorem 3 (see Kongo, 2018). Let ψ be a value on GN that satisfies
E, NEL, and NG. Then,
(i) ψ satisfies GM if and only if ψ = ED.
(ii) ψ satisfies ISM if and only if ψ = ESD.
3. Equal loss under separatorization
Given a TU-game, separatorization (Zou et al., 2020) of a player
means that the worth of any coalition containing this player
becomes equal to the sum of the stand-alone worths of the
players in this coalition. Formally, for (N, v) ∈ GN and h ∈ N , we
denote by (N, vh) the TU-game from (N, v) if player h becomes a
separator: For every S ⊆ N ,
vh(S) =
{∑
j∈S v({j}) if h ∈ S,
v(S) otherwise.
Notice that (vi)j = (vj)i for every pair i, j ∈ N . Thus, for
every coalition S ⊆ N , (N, vS), where the players in S became
separators, is well-defined and does not depend on the order
in which the players become separators.1 Note that (N, vN ) is
the corresponding additive TU-game of (N, v), namely vN (S) =∑
j∈S v({j}) for all S ⊆ N .
The following new axiom imposes that if a player becomes a
separator, all other players should be affected equally.
• Equal loss under separatorization, ELS. For all (N, v) ∈ GN ,
all h ∈ N and all i, j ∈ N\{h},
ψi(N, v) − ψi(N, vh) = ψj(N, v) − ψj(N, vh). (1)
4. Main results
4.1. Axiomatizations of the class of affine combinations of ED and
ESD
Before stating the characterizations, we derive a useful prop-
erty implied by the combination of E and ELS.
emma 1. If a value ψ on GN satisfies E and ELS, then for all
N, v) ∈ GN and i ∈ N,







roof. The proof is divided into three steps.
Step 1. By ELS, (1) is satisfied for any triple of players. Taking
∈ N and i ∈ N\{h}, summing (1) over j ∈ N\{h} and using E
ields that for all (N, v) ∈ GN , h ∈ N and i ∈ N\{h},













[v(N) − ψh(N, v) − vh(N) + ψh(N, vh)].
(3)
Step 2. Next, we show that for all (N, v) ∈ GN and S ⊆ N with
1 ≤ |S| ≤ n − 1,
ψ(N, vS) = ψ(N, vN ). (4)
1 Formally, vS (T ) =
∑
j∈T v({j}) if T ∩ S ̸= ∅, and v
S (T ) = v(T ) otherwise, is
obtained by sequentially separatizing the players in S in any order.






























We derive the assertion by an induction on the number of
separators.
Initialization. Since (N, vN\{h}) = (N, vN ) for any h ∈ N , then
(N, vS) = ψ(N, vN ) for all S ⊆ N with |S| = n − 1,
Induction hypothesis (IH). Assume that ψ(N, vT ) = ψ(N, vN )
olds for all T ⊆ N with |T | = t, 2 ≤ t ≤ n − 1.
Induction step. Consider (N, vS) ∈ GN and S ⊊ N such that
|S| = t − 1. Since vS(N) = vS∪{h}(N) =
∑
k∈N v({k}) and v
S({k}) =
S∪{h}({k}) = v({k}) for all k ∈ N , then by (3) applied to (N, vS)
e obtain that for all i ̸= h,
i(N, vS)−ψi(N, vS∪{h}) =
1
n − 1
[−ψh(N, vS)+ψh(N, vS∪{h})]. (5)
Pick any j ∈ N \ S and i ∈ N \ (S ∪ {j}) (which is possible since
S| ≤ n − 2). We obtain

































̸= 0, then ψi(N, vS) = ψi(N, vS∪{j}) for all i ∈
\ (S ∪ {j}). Pick any k ∈ S. By ELS, we have ψk(N, vS) −
k(N, vS∪{j}) = ψi(N, vS) − ψi(N, vS∪{j}) = 0, which implies
k(N, vS) = ψk(N, vS∪{j}). Since vS(N) = vS∪{j}(N), E then implies
j(N, vS) = ψj(N, vS∪{j}). There exists such j ∈ N for each S ⊊ N ,
o that ψ(N, vS) = ψ(N, vS∪{j}) IH= ψ(N, vN ).
Step 3. By (4), ψ(N, vh) = ψ(N, vN ) for all h ∈ N . Then (3)
mplies that for two distinct players i, h ∈ N ,
i(N, v) −ψi(N, vN ) =
1
n − 1
[v(N) −ψh(N, v) − vN (N) +ψh(N, vN )].
Summing the above equality over h ∈ N\{i} yields





(n − 1)[v(N) − vN (N)] −
∑
h∈N\{i}





(n − 2)[v(N) − vN (N)] + [ψi(N, v) − ψi(N, vN )]
]
.
It follows that n(n−2)n−1 [ψi(N, v) − ψi(N, v
N )] = n−2n−1 [v(N) − v
N (N)],
which implies (2) since n−2n−1 ̸= 0 (by n ≥ 3). □
emark 1. Lemma 1 indicates that any value on GN satisfying E
nd ELS is uniquely determined by an efficient value determined
n additive TU-games since vN (S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}) for all (N, v) ∈
GN and S ⊆ N . This means that, E and ELS in addition to
some axiom(s) that determine the payoff allocation for additive
TU-games, characterize a unique value on GN .
Remark 2. Any value with the form of (2) satisfies ELS, but need
not satisfy E. For example, the value ψ = ED + a, where a ∈ RN
is such that
∑
j∈N ai ̸= 0, satisfies (2) but not E.
To characterize the class of affine combinations of the ED and
ESD values, we introduce the well-known axioms of fairness and
homogeneity.• Fairness, F (van den Brink, 2002). For all (N, v), (N, w) ∈ GN
and all i, j ∈ N such that i and j are symmetric in (N, w),
ψi(N, v + w) − ψi(N, v) = ψj(N, v + w) − ψj(N, v).
• Homogeneity, H. For all (N, v) ∈ GN and all c ∈ R,
ψ(N, cv) = cψ(N, v).
Theorem 4. A value ψ on GN satisfies E, ELS, F, and H if and only
if there is β ∈ R such that ψ = βESD + (1 − β)ED.
Proof. Existence is obvious. For the uniqueness part, let ψ be
a value on GN that satisfies the four axioms. By Lemma 1 and
Remark 1, we have to show that ψ(N, v) = βESD(N, v) + (1 −
β)ED(N, v), β ∈ R, for all additive games (N, v). Let D(N, v) =
{i ∈ N | v({i}) ̸= 0}. We prove uniqueness by induction on
d(N, v) = |D(N, v)|.
Initialization. If d(N, v0) = 0, i.e. (N, v0) is the null game, then
H implies that ψi(N, v0) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Suppose that d(N, v) = 1, i.e. v = v({i})u{i}. Since any j, k ∈
N\{i} are symmetric in (N, u{i}), F implies that ψj(N, v0 + u{i}) −
ψj(N, v0) = ψk(N, v0 + u{i}) − ψk(N, v0), and thus ψj(N, u{i}) =
ψk(N, u{i}). E then implies that for all j ∈ N\{i},
ψj(N, u{i}) =
1 − ψi(N, u{i})
n − 1
. (6)
Next, pick any i, j ∈ N with i ̸= j, and consider (N,−u{i}) and
N, u{i} + u{j}). Since i and j are symmetric in (N, u{i} + u{j}), F
mplies that
i(N,−u{i} + u{i} + u{j}) − ψi(N,−u{i})
= ψj(N,−u{i} + u{i} + u{j}) − ψj(N,−u{i}).
y H,
i(N, u{j}) + ψi(N, u{i}) = ψj(N, u{j}) + ψj(N, u{i}). (7)
Combining (6) with (7) yields
1 − ψj(N, u{j})
n − 1
+ ψi(N, u{i}) = ψj(N, u{j}) +





1 − ψi(N, u{i})
n − 1
=
(n − 1)ψi(N, u{i}) − 1 + ψi(N, u{i})
n − 1
=
n.ψi(N, u{i}) − 1
n − 1
,
and similar for j, it follows that
i(N, u{i}) = ψj(N, u{j}). (8)
According to (8), setting a = ψi(N, u{i}) for all i ∈ N , and
=
na−1
n−1 , for v = v({i})u{i}, we have





















= v({i})a = v({i})ψi(N, u{i})
H
= ψi(N, v).
By (6) and H, ψj(N, v) = 1−an−1v({i}) = β ESDj(N, v) + (1 −
)EDj(N, v) for all j ∈ N\{i}.
Induction hypothesis. Assume that ψ(N, v′) is uniquely deter-
ined whenever d(N, v′) = k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1.
Induction step. Let (N, v) ∈ GN be an additive game such that
(N, v) = k+1. Take h ∈ D(N, v), and consider game (N, v′) given
by v′ = v−v({h})u . Take a j ∈ N \{h}. Then, for all i ∈ N \{j, h},{h}




























ψi(N, v) − ψj(N, v) = ψi(N, v′) − ψj(N, v′), (9)
where the right-hand side is determined by the induction hypoth-
esis.
Take g ∈ D(N, v) \ {h} (which exists since d(N, v) ≥ 2)
and j ∈ N \ {g, h} (which exists since n ≥ 3), and consider
v′′ = v − v({g})u{g}. Then F implies
ψh(N, v) − ψj(N, v) = ψh(N, v′′) − ψj(N, v′′), (10)
where the right-hand side is determined by the induction hypoth-
esis.
Finally, E implies that∑
i∈N
ψi(N, v) = v(N). (11)
Since the (n−2)+1+1 = n Eqs. (9)–(11) are linearly independent
in the n unknown payoffs ψi(N, v), these payoffs are uniquely
determined.
Thus, the payoffs in any additive game (N, v) ∈ GN are
uniquely determined for any choice of a = ψi(N, u{i}), i ∈ N ,
and thus for any choice of β . Since the corresponding affine
combination of the ESD and ED values satisfies the axioms, it
must be that ψ = βESD + (1 − β)ED. □
Notice that L implies H, and L and S together imply F. The
following corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.
Corollary 1. A value ψ on GN satisfies E, ELS, L, and S if and only
if there is β ∈ R such that ψ = βESD + (1 − β)ED.
Remark 3. Under E, L, and S, the nullifying player property
(NFP)2 and the dummifying player property (DFP)3 characterize
the ED value and the ESD value, respectively. Therefore, the
difference among the ED value, the ESD value, and the class of
their affine combinations is pinpointed to one axiom. Mind that,
from Remark 1, under E and ELS, DFP characterizes the ESD value,
whereas NFP does not characterize the ED value. Consider, for
example, ψi(N, v) = v(N)n + ai(N, v)v({i}) for all i ∈ N , where
: GN → RN is a function such that (i) a(N, v) = a(N, w) of
v({i}) = w({i}) for all i ∈ N , and (ii)
∑
i∈N ai(N, v)v({i}) = 0 for
ll (N, v) ∈ GN . This value also satisfies the three axioms.
We provide a characterization of the class of convex combina-
ions of the ED and ESD values, whose proof is omitted since it is
imilar to that of Theorem 1 (see Ferrières (2017)).
heorem 5. A value ψ on GN satisfies E, ELS, A, D, and SM if and
nly if there is β ∈ [0, 1] such that ψ = βESD + (1 − β)ED.
Corollary 1 and Theorem 5 show that Theorems 1 and 2 are
still valid if NEL is replaced by ELS, although (2) does not coincide
ith the formula of values satisfying E and NEL (see Formula
3), Ferrières, 2017).
emark 4. The axioms invoked in Theorem 4 and Corollary 1
re logically independent:
(i) The value given by ψi(N, v) = 0 for all i ∈ N , satisfies all
axioms except E.
(ii) The Shapley value satisfies all axioms except ELS.
2 Nullifying player property, NFP (van den Brink, 2007). For all (N, v) ∈ GN
and i ∈ N being a nullifying player in (N, v), ψi(N, v) = 0.
3 Dummifying player property, DFP (Casajus and Huettner, 2014a). For all












v({j})], for all i ∈ N,
(12)
satisfies all axioms except S and F.
(iv) Let a ∈ RN be such that
∑





+ ai, for all i ∈ N, (13)
satisfies all axioms of Theorem 4 except H.
(v) The value given by
ψ(N, v) =
{
ED(N, v) if v({i}) > 0 for all i ∈ N;
ESD(N, v) otherwise,
(14)
satisfies all axioms of Corollary 1 except L.
emark 5. The axioms invoked in Theorem 5 are logically inde-
endent:
(i) The value given by ψi(N, v) = 0 for all i ∈ N , satisfies all
axioms except E.
(ii) The Shapley value satisfies all axioms except ELS.
(iii) The value defined by (14) satisfies all axioms except A.
(iv) The value ψ = 2ED − ESD satisfies all axioms except D.
(v) The value ψ = 2ESD − ED satisfies all axioms except SM.
.2. Axiomatizations of the ED value and the ESD value
Notice that nullification of all players in a TU-game leads to
he null game, whereas separatorization of all players leads to
he corresponding additive TU-game. NG requires that all players
ain zero for any null game. This axiom is well adapted to the
epresentation of a special allocation among players under nulli-
ication, but not separatorization. Thus, NG is used in Theorem 3,
s well as other axiomatic results in Kongo (2018, 2019). Inter-
stingly, Theorem 3 is still valid when we use ELS instead of NEL.
o show this, we first characterize the ED value using the axiom
f nonnegativity.
• Nonnegativity, N. For all (N, v) ∈ GN with v(N) ≥ 0 and all
i ∈ N , ψi(N, v) ≥ 0.
Lemma 2. A value ψ on GN satisfies E, ELS, and N if and only if
ψ = ED.
Proof. It is clear that ED satisfies E, ELS, and N. Conversely, sup-
pose that ψ is a value on GN that satisfies the three axioms. For
any (N, v) ∈ GN , consider (N, w) ∈ GN such that w({i}) = v({i})
for all i ∈ N and w(N) = 0. By (2) (see Lemma 1) applied to (N, w)
and (N, wN ), we have ψi(N, w)−ψi(N, wN ) = − 1n
∑
j∈N w({j}) for






j∈N w({j}), where the last inequality holds from N. Then, E
mplies that ψi(N, wN ) = 1n
∑
j∈N w({j}) for all i ∈ N . Since
N, vN ) = (N, wN ), then ψi(N, vN ) = 1n
∑
j∈N v({j}). Again, by




j∈N v({j})] + ψi(N, v









Theorem 6. Let ψ be a value on GN that satisfies E, ELS, and NG.
Then,
(i) ψ satisfies GM if and only if ψ = ED.
(ii) ψ satisfies ISM if and only if ψ = ESD.











Proof. (i) Existence is obvious. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 2
and the fact that NG and GM imply N.
(ii) Existence is obvious. For the uniqueness part, let ψ be a
value on GN that satisfies the four axioms. Consider two additive
TU-games (N, v), (N, w) ∈ GN and i ∈ N such that v({i}) = w({i}).
By ISM, ψi(N, v) = ψi(N, w), which means that i’s payoff depends
only on her stand-alone worth. Next, consider the additive TU-
game (N, v′) ∈ GN such that v′({i}) = v({i}) and v′({j}) = 0
or all j ∈ N\{i}, and let (N, v0) ∈ GN be the null game. It









0) NG= v({i}). The assertion immediately
ollows from Remark 1. □
emark 6. Theorem 6(i) is still valid if GM is replaced by
oalitional monotonicity in van den Brink (2007), which states
hat ψi(N, v) ≥ ψi(N, w) for two games (N, v), (N, w) ∈ GN and
i ∈ N such that v(S) ≥ w(S) for all S ⊆ N with i ∈ N .
Remark 7. The axioms invoked in Theorem 6 are logically inde-
pendent:
(i) The value given by ψi(N, v) = 0 for all i ∈ N , satisfies all
axioms except E.
(ii) The value ψi(N, v) = i∑
j∈N j
v(N) for all i ∈ N satisfies E, NG,
and GM, but not ELS.
(iii) The value given by ψi(N, v) = v({i}) + i∑
j∈N j
[v(N) −∑
j∈N v({j})] for all i ∈ N satisfies E, NG, and ISM, but not
ELS.
(iv) The value defined by (13) satisfies E, ELS, and GM, but not
NG.
(v) The value ψ = ESD + a, where a ∈ RN is such that∑
j∈N aj = 0 and a ̸= 0, satisfies E, ELS, and ISM, but not
NG.
(vi) The value defined by (12) satisfies all axioms, but neither
GM nor ISM.
. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed the axiom of equal loss
nder separatorization, and have formulized the family of values
atisfying equal loss under separatorization and efficiency. Afterthat, we added other well-known axioms to characterize (i) the
class of affine combinations of the ESD and ED values, (ii) the
class of convex combinations of the ESD and ED values, (iii) the
ED value, and (iv) the ESD value.
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